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Introduction
As the federal government searches for ways to address the fiscal challenges facing the nation, one option is a carbon tax that would raise government revenue to reduce the deficit or facilitate broader tax reform. Recent estimates suggest that an economy-wide $25-per-ton carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) tax could yield annual revenues on the order of $125 billion per year, 1 which is about 1.3 times the size of the annual savings expected from the federal budget sequestration imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and modified by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012. In addition to its fiscal benefits, a tax on CO 2 emissions could be a potent environmental policy that would raise the costs of fossil fuels and accelerate investment in cleaner energy sources. This combination of fiscal and environmental benefits is the outcome of taxing a negative environmental externality (Goulder 1995; Parry and Oates 2000; Goulder 2002 ).
The largest emitter of CO 2 in the United States is the electric power sector, which was responsible for 38 percent of total emissions in 2011 (US Environmental Protection Agency 2013). Most of the CO 2 emissions from electricity production come from coal-fired generators, which emit CO 2 at an average rate just above one short ton 2 per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity generated, roughly twice the emissions rate of the average natural gas-fired, combined cycle power plant, which emits just under one-half of a short ton of CO 2 per MWh. Taxing carbon from electricity production would raise the cost of coal relative to both natural gas and nonemitting power generation options; it also would raise the cost of natural gas-fired generation relative to nonemitting sources. A carbon tax would also affect the retail price of electricity paid by consumers and would, in turn, affect electricity consumption; these effects would vary regionally depending on the mix of fuels used to produce electricity and how electricity prices are set.
Not only is the power sector the largest emitter of CO 2 , it is also the sector that offers the cheapest potential reductions in CO 2 emissions. The Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) for 2013 (Energy Information Administration [EIA] 2013) includes three side cases that incorporate economy-wide CO 2 taxes beginning in 2014 at $10, $15, and $25 per metric ton, respectively, and rising at 5 percent per year through 2040. In every case, EIA finds that about 90 percent of economy-wide CO 2 emissions reductions induced by the tax will come from the electricity sector. This implies that a carbon tax imposed only on the power sector at a level in the neighborhood of those modeled by EIA would harvest most of the cost-effective emissions reductions available in the economy, leaving few on the table. In a strict economic efficiency sense, an economy-wide tax is superior to a tax that is limited to the power sector. However, a power sector-only tax has the advantage of being simpler to implement than an economy-wide tax; considering that it would harvest most of the cost-effective reductions available, a tax imposed only on the power sector is a potentially potent policy prescription and is the subject of this paper.
Economists have long argued that an efficient carbon tax should be set at the level of marginal damages of carbon emissions (Baumol and Oates 1988 ). This conclusion is based on a model of a perfectly competitive market in which prices are always equal to marginal production cost, there are no preexisting distortionary taxes, and carbon tax revenues are returned to consumers as a lump-sum payment per capita. However, in American power markets, about twothirds of retail sales occur at a price based on cost of service, or average cost, not on marginal cost. Furthermore, virtually no customers pay prices that vary in real time with the cost of electricity production. In short, electricity prices never equal marginal cost, so taxing emissions at marginal damages may not be optimal. Tax interaction effects 3 are another consideration; through such effects, the use of tax revenue to offset preexisting distortionary taxes on capital or labor can improve the efficiency of tax policy but may cause the optimal tax rate to diverge from marginal damages. Although a carbon tax set at marginal damages is not generally optimal for the US power market, it may nonetheless be close to the optimum.
The term "social cost of carbon" (SCC) refers to the marginal damages of a small increase in carbon emissions. The relationship among increased CO 2 emissions, changes in climate, adaptation, and economic damages is complicated. As such, assigning a value to the damages attributable to marginal changes in CO 2 emissions is fraught with uncertainties (Greenstone et al. 2013) . In 2010, the Obama administration convened an Interagency Working Group (IWG) that developed a range of estimates of the SCC for use in policymaking-and, in particular, in regulatory impact analyses 4 -to assess the benefits and costs of policies with direct or indirect CO 2 emissions implications (IWG 2010) . Their conclusions emphasize the uncertainties in their estimates, and they present a set of possible SCC estimates over time.
Those estimates were revised upward by a subsequent IWG panel, whose report (IWG 2013) also presents a range of SCC estimates. The conclusions of these studies provide a focal point for setting a carbon tax designed to impose the SCC on the consumption of fossil fuels.
In this paper, we use the Haiku electricity market model to analyze the effects of a carbon tax imposed on electricity production based on the range of SCC estimates published in 2013 by the IWG. We examine how the taxes would affect emissions, consumption, fuel use, investment, regional electricity prices, and social welfare. 5 The time paths of the SCC estimates are approximately linear, so a carbon tax based on these estimates will unfold on a trajectory that is unlike the path of carbon allowance prices anticipated under a cap-and-trade policy on carbon emissions that allows for unlimited banking and borrowing of allowances. Cap-and-trade policies that allow banking of emissions allowances would induce an expected carbon price rising at a constant discount rate (Hotelling 1931; Cronshaw and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996) , not an approximately linear path. We compare the environmental and electricity market outcomes of the SCC-based carbon taxes to corresponding cap-and-trade scenarios that price carbon emissions on cap-and-trade paths.
Background on the Social Cost of Carbon
The goal of the SCC estimates, as provided in the IWG's initial report (2010) and its recent update (2013), is to enable cost-benefit analyses of federal regulations to account uniformly for the marginal benefits of reducing CO 2 emissions across the analyses performed by different federal agencies. The SCC represents estimates of the value of not emitting an additional ton of CO 2 . This includes, for example, the costs associated with avoiding negative impacts on agricultural productivity and human health as well as addressing increased property damage resulting from greater flood risks and changes in the value of ecosystem services due to climate change. The SCC estimates reflect global marginal damages, and this distinguishes them from damage estimates used in regulatory analyses of the benefits of reducing emissions of other pollutants, where only US impacts are considered. However, unlike other pollutants, CO 2 emissions have global impacts, and that is the rationale for valuing their marginal damages on a global basis.
The SCC estimates are highly uncertain. The components of that uncertainty include the future levels of greenhouse gas emissions, the effects of emissions on the climate system, the impact of climate changes on the environment, and how environmental impacts will translate into economic damages (IWG 2010) . The working group does not select a single time path for the SCC. Instead, it provides four trajectories based on different assumptions about social discount rates. The estimates are average results of three well-known integrated assessment models-DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy), PAGE (Policy Analysis of Greenhouse Effect), and FUND (Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution). The three models estimate the SCC by translating greenhouse gas emissions into changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, changes in temperature, and economic damages.
The models are standardized on three assumptions: socioeconomic and emissions trajectories, equilibrium climate sensitivity, and social discount rates. Each model produced five sets of results for each discount rate, representing five socioeconomic scenarios. These scenarios include varying estimates of gross domestic product, population, and emissions trajectories for carbon as well as non-CO 2 greenhouse gases. Three of the final paths are average values from across the three models and five socioeconomic scenarios; one path represents the 95th percentile estimate across the models and scenarios at the 3 percent discount rate (IWG 2010) . The reports provide SCC paths at discount rates of 5 percent, 3 percent, and 2.5 percent.
In an effort to capture impacts from climate change that are more extreme than expected, the reports also include results from the 95th percentile estimates across all three models at the 3 percent discount rate (IWG 2010) . The estimates from the 2013 report translated into 2009 dollars per short ton of CO 2 are shown in Table 1 . The 5 percent and 2.5 percent discount rates are different from the standard 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates used in regulatory impact analyses of proposed US regulations. Traditionally, 3 percent and 7 percent have been applied to benefits and costs expected to occur in the near term. However, the integrated assessment models measure damages in terms of consumption impacts; thus, the social rate of discount is more appropriate than the market rate of 7 percent that applies to changes in capital allocation over time. Also, the choice of discount rate has an important impact on the estimate of the SCC. In 2020, the SCC is $14 with a 5 percent discount rate, $49 with a 3 percent discount rate, and $74 with a 2.5 percent discount rate (IWG 2013) . The estimates increase based on rates endogenously determined within the three models (IWG 2010). These paths do not rise over time at the rate of interest, a key feature that we discuss in detail below.
The SCC reports have critics. Johnson and Hope (2012) point out that the appropriate discount rate in an intergenerational context, like that of global climate change, may be much lower than even the lowest rate evaluated by the IWG, 2.5 percent, which would raise the SCC 7 .
They point out also that assigning greater weight to economic damages in poorer countries (the IWG currently assigns equal weight to all countries) would push the SCC up further. They conclude that the IWG estimates of 2010 may be an order of magnitude too low. Pindyck (2013) questions the suitability of integrated assessment models for estimating the SCC because they are too assumption driven-particularly with responses to the economic damages of temperature changes and associated climate effects-and because they fail to account properly for catastrophic climate outcomes. He suggests a more back-of-the-envelope approach for catastrophic risk analysis, like that used to assess the risk of an American-Soviet thermonuclear exchange. We feel that an imperfect SCC estimate is better than none at all as certainly the SCC is not zero, and we remind the reader that the estimates are plural and uncertain.
Model and Scenarios
Haiku Electricity Market Model 8
Haiku is a partial equilibrium model that solves for investment in and operation of the electricity system in 22 linked regions of the contiguous United States, from 2013 to 2035. Each simulation year is represented by three seasons (spring and fall are combined) and four times of day (time blocks). For each time block, demand is modeled for three customer classes (residential, industrial, and commercial) in a partial adjustment framework that captures the dynamics of the long-run demand responses to short-run price changes. Specifically, aggregate demand in each season for each customer class is a function of current electricity price and electricity price 12 months prior. This structure allows for changes in electricity consumption or investments in long-lived energy-using capital equipment to persist into the future and for consumers to respond in the short run to changes in price.
Supply is represented using 58 model plants in each region-including various types of renewable energy, nuclear, natural gas, and coal-fired power plants-and assumed levels of and is modeled as a pipeline.
Operation of the electricity system (generator dispatch) in the model is based on the minimization of short-run variable costs of generation, and a reserve margin is enforced based on margins obtained in the AEO 2011. Fuel prices are benchmarked to the AEO 2011 forecasts for both level and supply elasticity, except for natural gas, which is benchmarked to the AEO 2013 (EIA 2013). 9 Coal is differentiated along several dimensions, including fuel quality and content and location of supply, and both coal and natural gas prices are differentiated by point of delivery. The price of biomass fuel also varies by region depending on the mix of biomass types available and delivery costs. All fuels are modeled with price-responsive supply curves. Prices for nuclear fuel and oil as well as the price of capital and labor are held constant.
Investment in new generation capacity and the retirement of existing facilities are determined endogenously 10 for an intertemporally consistent (i.e., forward-looking) equilibrium, based on the capacity-related costs of providing service in the present and into the future (goingforward costs) and the discounted value of going-forward revenue streams. Existing coal-fired facilities also have the opportunity to make endogenous investments to improve their fuel efficiency (Burtraw and Woerman 2013 The reserve price component of retail prices reflects the scarcity value of capacity and is set just high enough to retain just enough capacity to cover the required reserve margin in each time block. 12 We do not model separate markets for spinning reserves and capacity reserves. Instead, the fraction of reserve services provided by steam generators is constrained to be no greater than 50 percent of the total reserve requirement in each time block.
Scenarios
A baseline (BL) scenario and four scenarios of a carbon tax on an SCC trajectory comprise the core scenarios analyzed here. The BL is described below, followed by a brief description of the SCC scenarios. Each SCC scenario differs from the BL and from the other SCC scenarios only by the level of carbon tax imposed (zero for BL). Two other sensitivity scenarios, based on a cap-and-trade policy, are used to generate a carbon price trajectory unlike the SCC paths; these are also discussed below. The scenario specifications are summarized in Table 2 and are described in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Low
Carbon tax set at the 5 percent, mean SCC estimates for each year on all CO 2 -emitting electricity generators beginning in 2015.
Medium
Carbon tax set at the 3 percent, mean SCC estimates for each year on all CO 2 -emitting electricity generators beginning in 2015.
11 Electricity market regulatory restructuring currently has little momentum in any part of the country. Some of the regions that have already implemented competitive markets are considering reregulating, and those that never instituted these markets are no longer considering doing so. 12 Required reserve margins vary across regions and range from a low of 8 percent of peak load in Illinois and parts of New York State to a high of over 18 percent in the Missourri and Kansas region.
High
Carbon tax set at the 2.5 percent, mean SCC estimates for each year on all CO 2 -emitting electricity generators beginning in 2015.
Tail
Carbon tax set at the 3 percent, 95th percentile SCC estimates for each year on all CO 2 -emitting electricity generators beginning in 2015.
Cap CAIR also imposes annual and summertime emissions caps on nitrogen oxides in a similar, but not identical, group of states. MATS restricts emissions of heavy metals and acid gases from new and existing coal-and oil-fired power plants. It sets plant-specific emissions standards for mercury, regulates the emissions of filterable particulate matter as a surrogate for nonmercury heavy metals, and limits the emissions of hydrogen chloride as a surrogate for acid gases. MATS is expected to lead the cap on SO 2 emissions under CAIR to go slack, driving the Title IV allowance prices to zero ).
The BL includes state-level mercury regulations where they apply, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, all state-level renewable portfolio standards and renewable production tax credits, and federal renewable production and investment tax credits.
SCC: High, Medium, Low, Tail
The policy scenarios represent four different carbon tax trajectories based on the most recent US government SCC estimates, as represented in Table 1 . In each scenario, the relevant carbon tax levels are imposed on all CO 2 -emitting electricity generators beginning in 2015, and all other regulations remain unchanged from the BL. The High case corresponds to an SCC trajectory based on a 2.5 percent discount rate, the Medium case has an underlying discount rate of 3 percent, and the Low case has an underlying discount rate of 5 percent. These three price paths are based on mean estimates from the three integrated assessment models used to generate the SCC values. The Tail case, however, is based on a 3 percent discount rate but relies on the 95th percentile estimates from the underlying models.
Sensitivity: Cap and Trade with Banking
As noted above, the SCC tax rates increase over time at a relatively slow rate of change, between 0 and 4 percent per year depending on the scenario. In contrast, if CO 2 emissions were regulated under a cap-and-trade policy with banking of emissions allowances, then the price of CO 2 would be expected to rise at a constant discount rate, assumed to be 5 percent in Haiku. To compare the effects of these two price paths, we include two scenarios that represent cap-andtrade regulation with banking and borrowing of emissions allowances. The first achieves the same amount of cumulative emissions reductions between 2015 and 2035 as the Medium SCC case; the second matches the cumulative emissions reductions of the High SCC case. In both cases, emissions allowances under the cap are assumed to be auctioned by the government, so this form of regulation also generates government revenue.
Results
In this section, the CO 2 emissions outcomes associated with the different scenarios are 
Emissions
In all of the scenarios, relatively large emissions reductions occur in the initial year of the carbon tax, followed by more modest growth in reductions thereafter. In the right-hand panel of 
Sources of Emissions Reductions
The emissions reductions identified under each scenario discussed in the previous section are attributable to different combinations of sources depending on the level of the tax. Emissions reductions under the Low carbon tax scenario would be achieved through reductions in coal-fired electricity generation and end-use electricity consumption along with an increase in natural gasfired generation. At higher tax levels, expanded use of lower carbon intensity electricity generation resources-renewables (mostly wind) and nuclear-would help offset reduced coal generation. 13 For a high enough carbon tax, increased natural gas generation will cease to help offset reduced coal generation and will instead be displaced, like coal, by cleaner generation sources. Figure 2 shows the relative contributions to emissions reductions of shifting sources of supply and contracting demand. 14 The figure shows that, as the carbon tax rises across the SCC scenarios, an additional margin for emissions reductions is operative at each step. At the Low SCC tax rate, the natural gas and demand reduction margins are in effect. For the Medium SCC case, expansion in nuclear generation becomes a source of emissions reductions, and in the High SCC case, increased generation from renewables, which consist primarily of wind, starts to play a role. The Tail case brings about a reduction in natural gas generation by 2035.
The top-left panel of Figure 2 shows that emissions reductions under the Low SCC scenario are attributable to electricity demand reductions and growth in natural gas-fired generation, in roughly even shares throughout the modeling horizon. The Medium SCC scenario, in the top-right panel, shows more demand reductions and fuel switching to natural gas, as well as some growth in nuclear generation beginning in 2020. The bottom-left panel shows the High SCC scenario, with greater demand reductions and increases in nuclear generation, less growth in natural gas than under the Medium SCC scenario, and some incremental investments in renewables that occurs right away. The Tail scenario is shown in the bottom-right panel. More growth in demand reductions and renewables and nuclear generation is offset by a further decline in natural gas growth. Indeed, by 2035 under the Tail scenario, natural gas-fired generation actually declines relative to BL. 13 The Haiku model does not include solar photovoltaic technology, and the introduction of carbon taxes has virtually no effect on generation by concentrating solar generation, hydro power generation, or generation with biomass. 14 The attribution of emissions reductions to different sources in each simulation year depends on the change (relative to Baseline) in the emissions rate for each category of generators, including those that reduce their emissions and those that do not. Which category a particular type of generator falls into can vary over time and by policy scenario. For each generator type (nuclear, renewables, sometimes natural gas) that increases generation, the share of emissions reductions attributable to that increase is equal to the increase multiplied by the difference between the change in emissions rates at emitting generators that reduce generation (typically coal and, at high tax rates, natural gas) and the change in emissions rates from the type of generator that increases emissions (for renewables and nuclear this is zero by definition). The share of emissions reductions attributable to lower demand is the product of the change in demand times the average marginal change in the emissions rate across all types of generators that reduced emissions. Note: TWh = terawatt-hour. 15 If carbon tax revenues are allocated in ways that distort electricity markets, such as by subsidizing electricity production to mitigate the effect of the tax on consumers, then the price and consumption effects of the tax will vary from those shown here. The allocation of allowance revenue under a cap-and-trade policy is analogous and is analyzed by Paul et al. (2010) . The national average retail electricity prices shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 3 mask substantial regional heterogeneity in the price effects of the taxes. The state-specific electricity price effects of a carbon tax depend on factors that vary across the country, including the mix of installed capacity, the availability of resources (like wind or sunlight) for capacity expansion, electricity market regulation (competition or cost of service), weather, and consumer responsiveness to changes in price. Because the grid links local markets within each interconnection, the local price effects of a carbon tax depend not only on local conditions, but also on conditions in other parts of the interconnection. Table A3 , in the appendix, provides the state-level data behind the maps displayed in Figure 4 . 16 Haiku operates for electricity supply on a 22-region configuration of the contiguous United States. These statelevel prices are derived by extrapolating prices from the 22 region levels to the state level using historical data on electricity prices and consumption. 
Tax Revenues
The revenues collected by the government under a carbon tax could make a contribution to addressing the nation's current deficit. The effectiveness of a carbon tax in raising revenue depends on how responsive emissions are to a carbon tax; higher taxes induce fewer emissions, eating up the tax base. Figure 5 shows carbon tax revenues from the electricity sector. The Low case generates in the neighborhood of $20 billion annually through the first half decade, climbing to almost $35 billion per year by 2035. The tax level for the Medium case is more than twice as high as the Low level rate, yet due to declining emissions (the tax base), tax revenues will rise less than proportionally, reaching nearly $56 billion by 2035. In 2035, the tax roughly triples from the Low to Medium cases, but revenues rise by less than 50 percent. The pattern of declining tax base persists across the other two more expensive scenarios. Emissions decline so much under the Tail case that even though the price of carbon emissions is roughly doubled in 2035 between the High and the Tail scenarios, annual tax revenues are virtually unchanged because emissions are halved. An economy-wide carbon tax would generate disproportionately more tax revenue than a tax imposed only on the power sector. Because the carbon price elasticity of emissions is greater in the power sector than in the other major emitting sectors (at least for relatively low carbon prices), electricity is the least efficacious sector in which to tax carbon if the objective is to raise revenue. An economy-wide carbon tax in 2020 could raise 3.6 times more revenue than an electricity sector tax even though it would cover only about 2.6 times as many emissions at the current emissions share between the electricity sector and other sectors. 
Social Welfare
The economic welfare costs, environmental benefits, 18 and total welfare consequences of the policies are shown in Table 3 , all as changes from the BL scenario. Economic surplus is the sum of three components: consumer surplus, producer surplus, and government surplus. Avoided CO 2 damages are equal to the product of reduced CO 2 emissions and their value per ton. The SCC is the estimate of the value of a marginal reduction in CO 2 emissions, and that estimate changes across the four SCC scenarios. The dramatic increase in avoided CO 2 damages and total welfare moving from left to right across the table reveals not only higher CO 2 emissions reductions, but also the impact of placing greater value on reductions. One cannot conclude from these results that the Tail scenario is superior, only that for each estimate of the SCC, taxing carbon emissions at the SCC will enhance total welfare. The greater the value assigned to the SCC, the greater the welfare enhancement. In a perfectly competitive, first-best setting, taxing an environmental externality at marginal damages maximizes social welfare. The SCC is the measure of marginal damages, but US power markets are not perfectly competitive; thus, electricity prices never equal marginal costs. The divergence between price and marginal cost comes from cost-of-service regulation (average, not marginal cost pricing) and the lack of real-time pricing (marginal cost varies in real time, but price does not). Despite these divergences from the competitive model, a carbon tax set at the SCC may be close to the optimum. 
Sensitivity: Cap-and-Trade
The cap-and-trade sensitivity cases, based on the total cumulative emissions reductions in the Medium and High Tax scenarios, result in a substantially different trajectory of CO 2 emissions and costs than the associated tax scenarios, as shown in Figure 6 The welfare consequences of the cap-and-trade policies are not discussed here because they depend on the pace at which allowances are created by the government and the timing chosen by state public utility commissions to account for the value of banked allowances. For a scenario like those modeled here with a positive allowance bank throughout the modeling horizon, the government can pace the creation of allowances in an infinite number of ways-it needs only to create them fast enough for a positive allowance bank to persist and for the allowance price to rise at a constant discount rate. The alternatives for allowance creation that retain constant banking can have different welfare consequences depending on the choices made by the public utility commissions. For these reasons, welfare outcomes for the cap-and-trade scenarios are not reported here.
Conclusions
Concerns about the federal budget deficit, tax reform, and climate change all could be addressed by taxing carbon emissions, which would generate government revenue and reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change. The electricity sector, a major source of CO 2 emissions in the United States, can achieve emissions reductions at lower cost than other sectors. A carbon tax would affect both the size of electricity markets and the resources used to produce power. Conventional economic wisdom suggests that the socially efficient approach to regulating carbon externalities would be to adopt a tax equal to the social damages associated with an additional ton of CO 2 emissions-the SCC. The federal government has recently published a range of estimates of the SCC that can be used to set a carbon tax. This study analyzes the revenue implications of imposing a range of SCC-based taxes on the electricity sector as well as the impacts on emissions, electricity prices, electricity demand, the technologies and fuels used to produce electricity, and social welfare. These results are also compared to the effects of a cap-and-trade policy with banking that is designed to yield the same total emissions reductions over a 20-year horizon as two of the SCC-based carbon tax paths.
The differences in CO 2 emissions trajectories across the four SCC tax scenarios are substantial, but all of these scenarios produce large initial reductions, followed by more slowly growing reductions. This is in contrast to the reductions path laid out in the Copenhagen Accord, which is less ambitious in the early years, but ramps up quickly over time. We confirm that the level of the carbon tax affects tax revenues, and that revenues are concave in the tax rate because higher taxes reduce the tax base. Depending on the tax level, annual tax revenues in 2020 range from $20 billion to over $80 billion. For the lower tax rate scenarios, revenues grow over time, but for the Tail SCC tax case, revenues decline steadily over time as the tax rate grows and the tax base shrinks.
Electricity prices rise as a result of a carbon tax, with national average prices increasing between 7 and 50 percent in 2020. Price increases are especially large in the middle of the country and in those states that rely heavily on coal generation. States along the coasts are the least affected by a carbon tax, although under the High and Tail SCC scenarios, electricity prices in 2020 rise by at least 16 percent in every state except California.
The changes in electricity demand and technology mix induced by the carbon tax also vary across the different SCC tax scenarios. For the Low SCC scenario, the carbon reductions come primarily from an even mix of reductions in electricity demand and fuel switching from coal to natural gas. In the Medium SCC case, demand reductions and coal-gas fuel switching grow, and nuclear expansion makes a contribution. The High SCC case induces some increased generation from renewables on top of more contributions from demand reductions and nuclear, but a smaller contribution from increased natural gas. Under the Tail scenario, natural gas generation actually declines, with even greater shares of reductions coming from reduced demand and increased generation from nuclear and renewables.
The welfare consequences of an SCC-based carbon tax are similar to what economic theory would predict for a perfectly competitive market in which the optimal tax rate on carbon emissions is set at the value of marginal damages of carbon emissions (i.e., the SCC). We find that taxing emissions based on SCC is welfare enhancing, no matter the value of the SCC.
However, it is not necessarily welfare maximizing because the US electricity market is not perfectly competitive. Especially at larger valuations of the SCC, the optimal tax rate may be below the SCC.
Cap-and-trade policies with banking and borrowing produce steeper CO 2 price paths than analogous SCC-based carbon tax scenarios, resulting in expected carbon allowance prices that are lower in the near term and higher in the long term under cap and trade. A consequence of this is that a cap-and-trade scenario results in greater reliance on renewables and a lower carbon intensity configuration of the generation fleet in the long run. Given the uncertainty about the future evolution of estimates of the SCC and the fact that society is risk averse, moving more quickly toward a lower carbon generation fleet could be socially desirable.
Recent federal government efforts to estimate the SCC have produced a range of numbers that are currently being used by federal regulatory agencies to value the climate-related benefits of a host of government regulations. SCC estimates could also form the basis for a carbon tax and would provide a tax level that is commensurate with marginal damages of increased emissions. The large uncertainties represented by the range of SCC estimates complicate the identification of the right tax level. As our results show, the level of the tax matters for its efficacy in reducing emissions, its revenue-raising potential, and the extent to which it accelerates the transition toward a cleaner generation fleet. A solution to this multiobjective problem remains a subject for future research. 
